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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.

vs.

12260

CHARLES ALLEN McCARTHY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Charles Allen McCarthy, appeals from
a finding of guilty of attempted grand larceny and the
sentence imposed thereon in the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Stale of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On April 29, 1970, appellant Charles Allen McCarthy, having been convicted by a jury, was sentenced
1
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and committed to the Utah State Prison for the offense
of attempted grand larceny.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seks a reversal of the conviction and
dismissal of the case against him, or, in the alternative,
to have the case remanded for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
\Vitnesses observed the appelant and another unidentified individual both in the meat department of a
grocery store at the same time. There was no further
evidence connecting the two men. The other man was
stopped in the parking lot with a box of nineteen unpur·
chased hams in his possession. The appellant never left
the store and was not stopped with any hams in his
possession, but was detained as he was purchasing a
package of potato chips and a six-pack of beer at the cash
register. A second box of four hams was found in the
rear of the store. The trial court instructed the jury as
to the offenses of grand larceny, petty larceny, and at·
tempted grand larceny, but failed to submit appellant's
requested instruction and verdict of attempted pettv
larceny. After the appellant's exception was not rem·
edied, the appellant moved for a new trial because of the
omitted instruction. The motion was not granted.
2
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POINT I
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING THE
ELE1\1ENTS OF ATTEMPTED PETTY LARCENY AND FAILING TO SUBMIT TO THE
JURY A VERDICT INCLUDING THE OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED PETTY LARCENY.
The court in this case instructed the jury as to grand
larceny, petty larceny, and attempted grand larceny, but
declined to give the proposed instruction regarding attempted petty larceny. Neither did the court submit to
the jury the proffered verdict that included the offense
of attempted petty larceny. Counsel for the appellant
took proper exception to this omission ( T. 66) and later
made a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the
omission prejudiced the jury (R. 30). The lower court
erred in failing to instruct and submit a verdict as to this
lesser offense, and further erred by not granting appellant's motion for a new trial.
The most articulate expression of the Utah rule
governing the question of when instructions on lesser
offenses are necessary is found in the recent case of State
v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970). In
Gillian, the trial court ref used to give the requested instructions on the lesser offenses of second degree murder, voluntary and involuntary manslaughter in a homicide prosecution. The Utah Supreme Court reversed
the appellant's first degree murder conviction stating:

3
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One of the foundational principles in regard to
the ~ubmission of issues to juries is that where the
parties so request they are entitled to have in.
structions given upon their theory of the case·
and this includes on lesser offenses if any reason:
able view of the evidence would support such a
verdict._ This is in accord with the authorities generally, [See State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457
P.2d 618 ( 1969) ; State v. Hyams, 64 Utah 285,
230 Pac. 349 (1924); State v. Thompson, 110
Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153 (1946); Stevenson v.
Uni~ed States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896).] and with
the adjudications of this court, as stated in a number of cases dealing with instructions on lesser
offenses: In the case of State v. Johnson [112
Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947)] it is said:
That the defendant is entitled to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the case if there is any
substantial evidence to justify giving such an instruction.
Of similar import is State v. Newton [105 Utah
561, 144 P.2d 290 (1943)]:
We have held that eaoh party is entitled to have
his theory of the case which is supported by com·
petent evidence submitted to the .fury by appro·

priate instructions; and the failure to present for
the jury's consideration a party's theory by ap·
propriate instructions constitutes reversible error.
[Cases cited.]

The standards by which the court must determine if
inshuctions on lesser offenses is necessary is very clearly
expressed by the Gillian opinion. If any reasonable view
of the evidence would support a verdict on the lesser of·
fense, the court must instruct the jury on that offense.
4
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The fact that his standard only requires "any reasonable
yiew of the evidence" reflects the policy that judges
should be very hesitant to refuse to instruct and submit
verdicts as to lesser offenses. In State v. Hyams, 64
Utah 285, 230 Pac. 349 ( 1924), the Utah Supreme
Court, while reversing a conviction because instructions
on a lesser offense were refused, declared:
It is, however, always a delicate matter for a trial
court to withhold from the jury the right to firn1
the accused guilty of a lesser or included offense,
and determine the question of the state of the evidence as a matter of law. That, should be done
only in very clear cases. 230 Pac. at 349. (Emphasis added. )

In light of the Gillian standard, such a clear case
would only be present when no reasonable view of the
evidence would support a lesser verdict.
The reason the courts are so hesitant to uphold convictions achieved without instructions on lesser offenses
is that decisions by a trial court to withhold from the jury
the possibility of convicting for a lesser offense significantly limits the jury's function, and, in effect, forces
the defendant to prove his innocence.
In Gillian, this court quoted with approval from
Justice Straup's concurring opinion in State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55, 57 (1929).
If in a case of different degrees of the offense
there is sufficient evidence to submit the case to
the jury of the charged greater offense, I do not
see wherein it is the prerogative of the court to

5
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~irect the jury of wha~ degree only the jury may
fmd the defendant gmlty, or to direct them that
if they do not find him guilt~ o~ the chargetl
greater offense they must acqmt him. To permit '
the court to do that. is to permit it to be the judqc
of the facts. 463 P.2d at 813 (Emphasis added.)

State v. Barkas, 91Utah574, 65 P.2d ll30 (1937),
in reversing a conviction obtained without instructions
on lesser offenses, considered this issue thoroughly.
Should the trial court have instructed the jury as
to lesser or included offenses? The appellant re·
quested such instructions and after the court's
charge was read to the jury, the district attornev
called the attentions of the court to the fact th~t
the court had not included in the charge any lesser
or included offenses. The trial court replied that
in its judgment there was no evidence to justify a
verdict on a lesser offense and submitted the
cause to the jury on only two possible verdicts,
"guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with in·
tent to do bodily harm,'' or "not guilty." ... This
theory, however, clashes with two fundamental
rules in trial of criminal cases: It has the effect o/
the court weighing the evidence and, in effect,
limiting the ,jury to a consideration of only part
of the evidence (the defendant's); and it, in effect, casts upon tJie defendant the burden of prov·
ing his innocence or ,justification. 65 P .2d at 1132.
(Emphasis added.)
In our judicial system we presume a man innocent
until proven guilty. By withholding the possibility of
convictions for lesser offenses from the jury, a judge
permits proof of guilt of a lesser offense to suffice for
proof of the higher offense. Rather than putting the bur·

6
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den on the state to prove the highest degree of offense
that it can, this practice merely requires the state to
establish evidence of some guilt in order to obtain a conriction for the greatest offense. If the jury is convinced
that the defendant is guilty of something and the only
choice presented to it is guilty or not guilty of a greater
offense, only injustice can result. Either the jury is going to be repulsed by the implication of a penalty far
greater than what it feels the defendant's action warrants, and therefore set a man free whom they feel is
really guilty. Or the jurors are going to be repulsed by
the latter idea of freeing a guilty man and convict for a
crime beyond which they feel the evidence justifies.
Of course, if no reasonable man could view the evidence to permit a conviction for the lesser offense, the
court is justified as a matter of law in refusing to submit
to the jury instructions and a potential verdict for a
lesser offense. It is therefore crucial in the instant case
to apply the Gillian standard and determine "if any reasonable view of the evidence" would support the lesser
verdict of attempted petty larceny.
The most significant single fact of this case is that
the trial court found it proper to submit instructions and
a verdict on the crimes of petty larceny and attempted
grand larceny. The judge in this case felt the evidence
could support either of these crimes. The fact that the
offense of larceny perhaps was not complete and that the
jury could find only an a tempt is not in dispute. Neither
can it be disputed that the judge concluded the evidence

7
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put the value of the goods at issue. By submitting and
instructing on the crime of petty larceny the court demonstrated that it felt the jury should determine if the
state had proved the value of the hams was beyond fifty '
dollars ( R. 17). It is untenable to argue that evidence of
the value of the goods in question would support a conviction for the crime of petty larceny, and not support a
conviction for attempted petty larceny. The value of the
goods does not change merely because an attempt to take
them is not completed.
The testimony in this case indicated that the grocery store manager and one of his employees noticed
two individuals in the meat department ( T. 6) . One of
them, whom we only know as "the other individual,"
picked up a box of hams and walked out the front door
of the store ( T. 8) . The manager testified that he
stopped this man in the parking lot and that there were
nineteen hams in the box in his possession ( T. 8-10) . The
appellant never left the store but was seen heading in
the opposite direction of the individual stopped in the
parking lot after the two were observed together in the
meat department (T. 8). About five minutes after the
other man was apprehended, the appellant was detained
as he went through the check-out counter. He had no
hams in his possession and was at the time purchasing
some potato chips and beer ( T. 12). A second box, con·
taining four hams, was discovered a short time later in
the back of the store (T. 10).
The store butcher testified that he thought the value
of the nineteen hams taken from "the other individual"

8
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were valued at about eighty dollars ( T. 50). Of course,
the value of ham is not that easy to determine and the
jury should have the choice to accept or reject the
butcher's opinion. In this case the judge allowed the
jury to make this choice when they considered the offense
of larceny, but determined the butcher's assessment of
the value correct as a matter of law for the offense of attempted larceny. Removing this element of the offense
from the jury is not only improper, it is logically inconsistent.
In addition, there was no direct evidence that the
appellant and the individual apprehended with the nineteen hams were collaborators. The only evidence that
connected them at all was that they were both seen in the
meat department at the same time. Clearly, it is for the
jury to determine if these two men acted together or
separately. It is reasonable to conclude that the jury felt
the evidence did not prove (beyond a reasonable doubt)
that the appellant acted in concert with the other man,
but that they were convinced (beyond a reasonable
doubt) that the appellant had tried to take the four hams
found in the back of the store. Indeed, given the lack of
any evidence of a conspiracy, the fact that the four hams
were found in the general area where the appellant was
observed, and the rather suspicious actions of the appellant after he was apprehended, this is a very likely
conclusion for the jury to reach.
This theory only connects the appellant with four
hams and would only support a conviction of attempted
petty larceny. Yet, because of the failure to instruct as
9
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to this offense any juror reaching this conclusion would
be forced to either acquit or convict for the greater of.
fense.
In summary, the jury concluded in this instance that
the offense of larceny had not been completed, and re·
turned a verdict of attempt. The evidence clearly put
the value of the goods at issue, and the trial court recog.
nized this by instructing the jury on petty larceny. Since
the jury found only an attempt, and the value of the
goods was questionable, it is not only reasonable, it i~
likely that the evidence supported a verdict of attempted
petty larceny. The court failed to instruct and submit as
to this verdict and the only proper remedy in this situa·
tion is to reverse and remand. State v. Gillian, 23 Utah
2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Barkas, 91 Utah
574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937); State v. Hyams, 64 Utah
285, 230 Pac. 349 ( 1924).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully con·
tended that the conviction against appellant should be
reversed, or, in the alternative, that the case should be
remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
410 Empire Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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